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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
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With the exception of the preceding misleading 
implication, Johnson accurately states the history of this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Billy Johnson was hired as an at-will employee of 
Thiokol in 1979. Johnson's Affidavit f 4.3 He did not have a 
contract with Thiokol for a definite duration or one that 
restricted Thiokol's ability to terminate him. Johnson's 
Affidavit 1 5. Nor did he have an implied contract. The 
introduction to Thiokol's Employee Handbook (the "Handbook") 
specifically provided as follows: 
This book is provided for general guidance only. 
The policies and procedures expressed in this 
book, as well as those in any other personnel 
materials which may be issued from time to time, 
do not create a binding contract or any other 
obligation or liability on the company. Your 
employment is for no set period and may be 
terminated without notice and at will at any 
time by vou or the Company. The Company 
reserves the right to change these policies and 
procedures at any time for any reason. 
R. 80. (emphasis added). 
On March 13, 1986, and August 12, 1986, Johnson was 
verbally cautioned for improper job performance. R. 112. On 
October 7, 1986, Johnson received a written Notice of Caution 
for Careless or Inefficient Performance of Duty. R. 112. 
3 While part of the record, Johnson's Affidavit is separately bound. 
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On July 8, 1988, Johnson was assigned as an inspector 
of the leak check test on the redesigned O-ring system. 
R. 20. The inspection criteria required that Johnson 
"personally witness" the set-up procedure and then verify 
compliance. R. 22. Johnson verified that he had personally 
witnessed the procedure when, in fact, he had not. R. 22. 
During the set-up two high pressure nitrogen gas hoses had not 
been connected properly. R. 23. When the test was run the 
next day overpressurization of the O-ring occurred causing 
property damage and a 20-day delay in test firing. R. 22-23. 
Johnson was aware that the verification he signed 
signified he had personally witnessed the test set-up when he 
had not done so. Johnson has admitted that disciplinary 
action was an appropriate response to his behavior. See 
Exhibit E to Johnson's Affidavit, p. 3. 
Following this incident, Johnson was terminated on 
July 20, 1988, for Careless or Inefficient Performance of 
Duty. R. 110. Johnson subsequently appealed his termination 
through internal grievance procedures established by Thiokol 
and published in its Handbook. Johnson's Affidavit 1 8. Both 
the Director and the Vice President of Human Resources 
subsequently affirmed the termination. Exhibits F & G to 
Johnson's Affidavit. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Handbook had a clear and prominent 
disclaimer unequivocally and expressly disavowing the creation 
of a contract, its provisions could not give rise to an 
implied contract as a matter of law. Thus, Johnson was an at-
will employee who could be terminated without cause. 
Accordingly, summary judgment for Thiokol was appropriate. 
Even if the Handbook had not expressly disavowed the 
formation of a contract, summary judgment was appropriate 
because Thiokol's actions were in accord with its Handbook. 
Johnson was terminated for conduct for which termination was 
an appropriate disciplinary action under the terms of the 
Handbook. 
Finally, Thiokol complied with the procedural 
guidelines detailed in its Handbook. Johnson was afforded the 
designated grievance procedures, and his termination was 
affirmed by both the Director and the Vice President of Human 
Resources. Thus, even if the Handbook could be interpreted as 
a contract requiring Thiokol to afford Johnson certain 
procedural protections prior to discharge, these protections 
were provided. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE IS 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that 
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith" if "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." As previously 
explained by the Court, "The foregoing rule does not preclude 
summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, 
but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." 
Healar Ranch Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 
1980). The United States Supreme Court recently explained 
what this means in a ruling based on the identically worded 
federal rule: 
By its very terms, this standard provides that 
the mere existence of some alleged factual 
dispute between the parties will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported motion for summary 
judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
genuine issue of material facts. 
[T]here is no issue for trial unless there 
is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving 
party for a jury to return a verdict for that 
party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or 
is not significantly probative, summary judgment 
may be granted. 
-5-
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 
2510-11 (1986)(emphasis in original). Accord, Snyder v. 
Merklev. 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). 
As stated by the Court, "a major purpose of summary 
judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties 
to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising. Inc. v. Lundaren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). 
To accomplish this purpose, "specific facts are required to 
show whether there is a genuine issue for trial. The 
allegations of a pleading or factual conclusions of an 
affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." 
Id*. 
As plainly demonstrated by the Record and by 
Johnson9s Brief, there are no disputed issues of material fact 
present in this case. Johnson has admitted that he committed 
the infraction for which he was discharged (R. at page 
following 3) and that disciplinary action was appropriate for 
his conduct. Exhibit E to Johnson's Affidavit. He attempts 
to create a material factual dispute by urging that Thiokol 
put him in a position where he had to engage in the conduct 
for which he was discharged. While Thiokol vigorously 
disputes these facts, for purposes of summary judgment, it is 
willing to accept them as true because they are not material. 
Johnson was an at-will employee. Johnson has acknowledged 
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that the Handbook expressly disavowed contractual intent and 
reaffirmed the at-will nature of the employment relationship. 
Brief of Appellant at 18. While Johnson has attacked the 
disclaimers legal effectiveness, this is a question of law, 
the resolution of which is appropriate on summary judgment. 
Moreover, the discipline and discharge guidelines outlined in 
the Handbook and Thiokol's compliance with these guidelines 
cannot, as a matter of law, create an implied-in-fact contract 
that Johnson could only be discharged for cause. Accordingly, 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Thiokol should be affirmed. 
II. BILLY JOHNSON WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE AND THUS 
COULD BE DISCHARGED AT THE WILL OF THIOKOL. 
A. Johnsons Factual Allegations Are 
Insufficient as a Matter of Law to Create 
an Implied-in-Fact Contract that He Would 
Be Discharged only for Cause. 
In Utah, an employee generally "has no right of 
action against his employer for breach of the employment 
contract upon being discharged." Bihlmaier v. Carson. 603 
P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979). The at-will employment 
relationship can be modified, however, by express or implied 
stipulations of the parties. Rose v. Allied Development Co.. 
719 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1986). In order to modify the 
employment relationship, "the existence of an employment 
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agreement not terminable at will must be established by more 
than subjective understandings or expectations." Id. at 86. 
Thus, an employee's "understanding of [certain] events, 
without more, is insufficient to make an implied contract." 
In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 
1044 & 1051 (Utah 1989), the Court held that the presumption 
of an at-will employment relationship can only "be overcome by 
an affirmative showing by the plaintiff that the parties 
expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to 
terminate the relationship for cause alone." Thus, in order 
to avoid summary judgment, Johnson was required to allege 
facts that the parties expressly or impliedly agreed to 
terminate the relationship for cause alone. 
Johnson's sole allegations supporting his claim that 
his employment at-will relationship was modified by an 
implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for cause are 
summarized by Johnson as follows: 
Johnson further agrees that Thiokol's Handbook 
does contain disclaimer language within its 
introductory paragraph that the policies and 
procedures within the Handbook do not evidence 
contractual intent and that Thiokol reserves the 
right to terminate any employee at any time, 
with or without cause. Johnson, however, argues 
that the substantial space and language 
committed by Thiokol within its Handbook to its 
administration and use of the annual employee 
performance evaluation program and to employee 
discipline and grievance procedures create, of 
themselves, a material issue of fact that an 
implied-in-fact contract existed between Thiokol 
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and Johnson that he could be dismissed from 
employment only for good cause, That material 
fact issues exist as to whether an implied 
agreement existed between Thiokol and Johnson is 
further underscored by the recognition that 
Thiokol did not undertake to dismiss Johnson as 
an employee-at-will. Thiokol voluntarily and 
knowlinglv Tsicl terminated Johnson's employment 
with specific reference to and sole reliance 
upon the employee discipline and employee 
grievance provisions within its Handbook, 
Brief of Appellant, p. 15 (emphasis added). These allegations 
amount to an assertion that the articulation and observance of 
evaluation, discipline, and discharge procedures create an 
implied-in-fact exception to the employment at-will doctrine, 
Johnson cites no language, because there is none, in the 
evaluation, discipline, or discharge sections of the Handbook 
that so much as implies that discharge can be for cause only. 
More importantly, Johnson has cited absolutely no support for 
his remarkable proposition that the mere existence of and 
compliance with orderly procedures can legally give rise to a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge.4 
Johnson's claim that Thiokol's compliance with the 
Handbook's guidelines regarding terminations and grievances 
gave rise to an implied-in-fact contract is unsupportable. If 
Thiokol followed its guidelines then Johnson cannot be heard 
to complain. Further, complying with procedures detailed in a 
4 This deficiency is particularly evident since that evaluation system is 
set forth in a handbook which expressly disclaims contractual liability 
and explicitly reaffirms the at-will nature of the employment 
relationship. See Part C, infra. 
-9-
handbook which preserved the right to terminate at will 
cannot, as a matter of law, create an implied-in-fact contract 
to discharge only for cause. Nork v. Fetter Printing Co.. 7 38 
S.W.2d 824, 827 (Ky. App. 1987). Therefore, summary judgment 
is appropriate. 
B. Summary Judgment Based on the Terms of the 
Handbook Is Appropriate. 
The question of whether the Handbook modified the 
employment relationship is a question of law appropriate for 
summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983)("the meaning of the contract 
can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary 
judgment"); Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 
Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1965)("Where the 
interpretation of a document was thus dispositive of the case, 
the use of the summary judgment procedure was particularly 
appropriate because it saved the time, effort and expense of a 
trial"). Summary judgment based on the interpretation of an 
employee handbook is appropriate in discharge litigation as 
well. As the Court recently held: 
Under Berube, then, a fact question exists 
as to whether the at-will presumption has been 
rebutted and whether the provisions of the 
policy manual were part of the terms of 
employment. However, despite the existence of 
this fact question, we conclude that the summary 
judgment was properly granted. This is because 
even if Caldwell were successful in making the 
policy manuals discharge provisions the terms 
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of h i s employment, those provis ions are not 
ambiguous, and in the absence of ambiguity, the 
interpretat ion of a contrac t ' s terms i s a 
question of law, a question we can determine as 
wel l as the t r i a l court. We conclude that [the 
employer] could not be found to have breached 
the terms of the manual when i t discharged 
Caldwell. 
Caldwell v . Ford. Bacon & Davis Utah. I n c . . 777 P.2d 483, 485-
86 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) ( c i t e s omitted) . Accord, Corum v. Farm Credit 
Serv ices . 628 F. Supp. 707, 715 (D. Minn. 1986)("Summary 
judgment, however, i s appropriate where, even accepting a 
p l a i n t i f f ' s vers ion of the fac t s as true , the p l a i n t i f f cannot 
e s t a b l i s h a modification of the a t - w i l l employment 
d o c t r i n e . " ) . Thus, when the employee handbook preserves the 
r ight to terminate at w i l l and contains no language indicat ing 
that discharge can only be for cause, summary judgment i s 
appropriate.5 
5 Johnson c i t e d Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P. 2d 
1081, 1088 (1984)(en banc), on behalf of h i s argument that the 
discuss ion of employee d i s c ip l ine and grievance procedures within the 
Handbook created a material fac t . Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-21. The 
Thompson handbook did not not include a disclaimer, however, and 
Washington courts have subsequently held that the interpretat ion of a 
personnel manual and the e f fec t iveness of a disclaimer within i t , "is a 
question of law for the court.'' Messerlv v. Asamera Minerals. (U.S.^) 
I n c . . 55 Wash. App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1989); Stewart v. Chevron 
Chemical Co.. I l l Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1988)(en banc). 
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C. As a Matter of Law, the Handbook Did Not 
Modify the At-Will Nature of J o h n s o n s 
Employment. 
Thiokol 's Handbook begins with the fol lowing 
introduct ion: 
This book i s provided for general guidance only. 
The p o l i c i e s and procedures expressed in t h i s 
book, as wel l as those in any other personnel 
materia ls which may be issued from time to time, 
do not create a binding contract or anv other 
ob l iga t ion or l i a b i l i t y on the company. Your 
employment i s for no s e t period and may be 
terminated without not ice and at w i l l at any 
time by vou or the Company. The Company 
reserves the r ight to change these p o l i c i e s and 
procedures at any time for any reason. 
R. 80 (emphasis added). This disclaimer i s c l ear in i t s 
meaning and placed conspicuously at the very top of page 1 of 
the Handbook. I t s p e c i f i e s that the Handbook does not create 
a contract . Further, i t firmly r e i t e r a t e s the a t - w i l l 
doctr ine: "Your employment i s for no s e t period and may be 
terminated without not ice and at w i l l at any t ime." Id . 6 
Utah law has recognized that disc la imers can 
e f f e c t i v e l y avoid contractual l i a b i l i t y . See, e . g . , L.A. 
Young Sons Construction Co. v . County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 
1034, 1038-39 (Utah 1978).7 In fac t , the Court recent ly held 
6 Johnson has never a l leged that the Handbook's provisions were modified by 
oral assurances of discharge only for cause. 
7 Utah courts have a lso impl i c i t l y acknowledged that a disclaimer in an 
employee handbook e f f e c t i v e l y el iminates the p o s s i b i l i t y of an implied-
i n - f a c t contract . Both Berube, 771 P.2d at 1049-50, and Gilmore v. Salt 
Lake Area Community Action Program. 775 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1989), 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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that a disclaimer by a des igner-bui lder of a mall and o f f i c e 
tower that i t s design did not comply with appl icable building 
codes was e f f e c t i v e . Allen Stee l Co. v. Crossroads Plaza 
Assoc ia tes , 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 13. See a l so id . at 17 
(Zimmerman concurrence). 
Despite the ex i s tence of the disclaimer in the 
Handbook, Johnson argues that the s e t t i n g forth of certa in 
d i sc ip l inary procedures n u l l i f i e s the statement a t the 
beginning of the Handbook. Johnson i s not the f i r s t 
discharged employee to make such an argument. Indeed, 
fol lowing the adoption of an impl ied- in- fact exception to the 
employment at w i l l doctr ine , numerous s t a t e and federal courts 
have confronted and rejected t h i s very argument.8 The 
Footnote cont inued from previous page. 
c e r t , denied. 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1990), were remanded for a 
de te rmina t ion of whether the implied terms in the employment con t r ac t 
were "express ly disavowed." Fur ther , the Court in Berube. 771 P.2d a t 
1044, s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t an " im p l i ed - in - f ac t promise cannot, of 
course , c o n t r a d i c t a w r i t t e n con t r ac t term." 
8 Courts in the following s t a t e s have s t a t e d , of ten in the context of a 
g ran t or affirmance of summary judgment, t h a t a d i sc la imer in an 
employee handbook i s an e f f e c t i v e means of mainta ining an employment a t -
w i l l r e l a t i o n s h i p : Alabama fHoffman-La Roche. Inc . v . Campbell. 512 So. 
2d 725, 734 (Ala. 1987); McCluskev v . Unicare Health F a c i l i t y . I n c . . 484 
So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1986)] , Arizona fChambers v . Vallev N a t ' l Bank. 3 
I .E.R. Cases 1476, 1479 (D. Ar iz . 1988); Leikvold v . Vallev View 
Community Hosp.. 141 Ar iz . 544, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984)(In b a n c ) ] , 
Ca l i fo rn i a fFolev v . I n t e r a c t i v e Data Corp. . 765 P.2d 373, 387, n. 23 
(Cal . 1988)( in bank) ; Crain v. Burroughs Corp. . 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 
(CD. Cal . 1983)] , Colorado fTherrien v. United A i r l i n e s . I n c . . 670 F. 
Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987)] , Connecticut fFinlev v. Aetna Life & 
Casualty Co. . 202 Conn. 190, 520 A.2d 208, 214, n. 5 (1987) ] , the 
D i s t r i c t of Columbia fMCI Telecommunications Corn, v . Wanzer. F.2d 
, 1990 WL 17910, a t 3-4 of p r i n t e d copy (4th Ci r . 1990)(applying D.C. 
l a w ) ] , Florida fLaRocca v . Xerox Corp. . 587 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D. 
Footnote cont inued on next page. 
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Kentucky Court of Appeals, for example, affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the employer and held as fo l lows: 
[The employee] t r i e s to argue away the c l ear 
language appearing on the manual's f ina l page 
by referr ing to the manual's procedural 
g u i d e l i n e s , and both p a r t i e s ' re l iance upon 
them. Appellate would g ive contract s t a t u s to 
the manual and n u l l i f y the c l e a r l y - s t a t e d 
d isc la imer . . . . I f appe l lant ' s reasoning i s 
thought through to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, 
Footnote cont inued from previous page. 
F la . 1984)] , Georgia fGale v. Haves Microcomputer P r o d s . . 192 Ga. App. 
30, 383 S.E.2d 590, 591 (1989)] , Hawaii fMorishige v . Soencecl i f f Corp. . 
720 F. Supp. 829, 835 (D. Haw. 1989)] , Idaho fHolmes v . Union Oil Co. of 
C a l i f . . 114 Idaho 773, 760 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Ct. App. 1988)] , I l l i n o i s 
fDoe v . F i r s t N a t 1 ! Bank of Chicago. 865 F.2d 864, 873 (7th Cir . 1989) 
(applying I l l i n o i s law); Hogge v. Champion L a b o r a t o r i e s . I n c . . 190 111. 
App. 3d 620, 546 N.E.2d 1025, 1031 (5 D i s t . 1989); Bennett v . Evanston 
H O S P . . 184 111. App. 3d 1030, 540 N.E.2d 979, 980-81 (1 D i s t . 1989); 
Moore v. I l l i n o i s Bel l Tel . Co.. 155 111. App. 3d 781, 508 N.E.2d 519, 
521 (2 D i s t . ) , appeal denied. 113 111. Dec. 303, 515 N.E.2d 112 (111. 
1987)] , Kansas fF le tcher v . Weslev Medical Center . 585 F. Supp. 1260, 
1264 (D. Kan. 1984)] , Kentucky fNork v . F e t t e r P r i n t i n g Co. . 738 S.W.2d 
824, 827 (Ky. App. 1987)] , Maryland fCas t ig l ione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.. 
69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786, 793-94 (1986), c e r t , denied, 309 Md. 325, 
523 A.2d 1013 (1987) ] , Michigan fin re C e r t i f i e d Quest ion. 443 N.W.2d 
112, 113-14 (Mich. 1989); Dell v . Montgomery Ward & Co. . 811 F.2d 970, 
972-74 (6th C i r . 1987)(applying Michigan law); S i t ek v . Fores t City 
E n t e r s . . I n c . . 587 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (E.D. Mich. 1984)] , Minnesota, 
fAudette v. N.E. S t a t e Bank of Minneapolis . 436 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. 
App. 1989); Simonson v . Meador D i s t r i b . Co. . 413 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. 
App. 1987); Pine River S ta t e Bank v . M e t t i l l e . 333 N.W. 2d 622, 627 
(Minn. 1983)] , Miss i ss ippi fPerrv v . Sears Roebuck & Co. . 508 So. 2d 
1086, 1088-89 (Miss. 1987)] , Nebraska fMorris v . Lutheran Medical 
Center . 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1983); Mau v. Omaha N a t ' l 
Bank. 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1980) ] , New Jersey fWare v. 
P ruden t i a l I n s . Co. . 220 N.J . Super. 135, 531 A.2d 757, 761 (1987), 
c e r t , denied. 113 N.J . 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988); Woollev v . Hoffmann-La 
Roche. I n c . . 99 N.J . 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271, modified. 101 J . J . 10, 
499 A.2d 515 (1985) ] , North Dakota fEldridge v . Evangel ica l Lutheran 
Good Samaritan Soc 'v . 417 N.W.2d 797, 800 (N.D. 1987); Bai lev v. Perkins 
R e s t a u r a n t s . I n c . . 398 N.W.2d 120, 121-23 (N.D. 1986)] , Ohio fMcKennev 
v . S t r u c t u r a l F i b e r s . I n c . . 1989 WL 85679, a t 3 of p r i n t e d copy (Ohio 
App. 1989)] , Oklahoma fHinson v . Cameron. 742 P.2d 549, 560 (Okla. 
1987)(pro-employee d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n ) ] , Oregon fThompson v. Goodyear 
Ti re & Rubber Co. . 4 I .E.R. Cases 1774, 1778 (D. Or. 1989)] , South 
Carol ina fSmall v . Springs I n d u s . . I n c . . 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 
455 (1987) ] , Tennessee fMacDougal v . Sears . Roebuck & Co. . 624 F. Supp. 
Footnote cont inued on next page. 
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virtually every policy and procedure manual 
would create a contract of employment; those 
without a disclaimer would because they would 
have no disclaimers, and those with 
disclaimers would because the disclaimers 
would be nullities. 
Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Ky. App. 
1987). As summarized by a federal court in Michigan, *[I]f 
employers are bound by statements of policy favorable to 
employees under Toussaint.9 they should conversely be allowed 
to avail themselves of statements of policy which clearly set 
forth that employees are subject to discharge without cause." 
Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 
(E.D. Mich. 1983). 
There are two major reasons why courts have held that 
disclaimers in employee handbooks are effective in preventing 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
756, 759 (E.D. Tenn. 1985)], Virginia \White v. Fed. Express Corn.. 729 
F. Supp. 1356, 1990 WL 7343, at 7-8 of printed copy (E.D. Va. 1990)], 
Washington rMesserlv v. Asamera Minerals. (U.S.) Inc.. 55 Wash. App. 
811, 780 P.2d 1327, 1330 (1989); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.. 102 
Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984)(en banc)], and Wyoming 
fEmployment Sec, fonmi, of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors. Ltd.. 786 
P.2d 866, 1990 WL 7191, at 5 of printed copy (Wyo. 1990)]. While the 
majority of courts confronted with employee handbook disclaimers have 
given them effect, there have been a few factually distinguishable 
decisions which have held to the contrary. In the main, these are cases 
where subsequent oral assurances were made that dismissal would only be 
for cause [see, e.g.. Schioani v. Ford Motor Co.. 302 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 
1981); Ferraro v. Koelsch. 368 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Wis. 1985)] or cases 
where the disclaimer was hidden and did not reaffirm the at-will nature 
of employment fsee, e.g.. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial HOSP.. 710 
P.2d 1025, 1037 (Ariz. 1985)]. Neither of these situations is 
applicable to the present case. 
9 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 
(1980), was the Michigan equivalent of Berube. 
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the terms of those handbooks from becoming binding upon the 
employer. First, a "cardinal rule in construing . . . a 
contract is to give effect to the intentions of the parties." 
Berube at 1044 (lead opinion). Accord, id. at 1052 (Zimmerman 
concurrence); Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, 775 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 127 
Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1990); Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 
P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1986). When the employer specifically sets 
forth that its handbook is not a contract, it is clear that 
making the handbook's provisions contractually binding was not 
within its intention. See, e.g., Nork, 738 S.W.2d at 827. 
The Handbook specified that the "policies and procedures 
expressed in this book . . . do not create a binding contract 
or any other obligation or liability on the Company." R. 80. 
This language clearly indicates that Thiokol was not showing 
an intention to make its Handbook's guidelines contractually 
binding. 
Second, public policy reasons support giving effect 
to an employer's disclaimer. Most courts to consider the 
subject have chosen not to discourage the preparation of the 
disciplinary sections of employee handbooks by giving them a 
construction artificially favorable to employees. On the 
contrary, public policy would seem to strongly favor the 
attempt by employers to make personnel practices uniform 
-16-
through the use of such handbooks. See Fink v. Revco Discount 
Drug Centers, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (W.D. Mo. 1987). 
If certainty in employment relationships is to be 
enhanced, it is imperative that disclaimers in employee 
handbooks be given effect. To rule otherwise would force 
employers to do away with employee handbooks (or at least 
substantial portions of them) to avoid jury second-guessing of 
every employment decision. See Finley, 520 A.2d at 214, n. 5; 
Nork, 738 S.W.2d at 827. The elimination of employee 
handbooks would seriously impair the quality of work 
relationships for the many employees who have benefited from 
them in the past and leave employees without any guidelines as 
to how an employer might respond. Fink, 666 F. Supp at 1328; 
Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271.10 Further, a refusal to give 
effect to employee handbook disclaimers would impose a high 
cost of uncertainty on employers. Cf. Berube at 1052 
(Zimmerman concurrence). Many employers who wished to issue 
employee handbooks but did not desire contractual liability 
10 According to the Woollev court: 
Manuals can be very helpful tools in labor relations, helpful 
both to employer and employees, and we would regret it if the 
consequences of this decision were that the constructive 
aspects of these manuals were in any way diminished. 
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have included disc la imers within them. Indeed, many a r t i c l e s 
have advised doing so . 1 1 
Thus, in order to g ive e f f e c t to the in tent ions of 
the p a r t i e s and for public po l i cy reasons, t h i s Court should 
hold as have the vas t majority of other courts who have 
considered the i s sue that employers may avoid implied 
contracts by express ly disavowing them. The present case 
provides exact ly such a s i t u a t i o n . Thiokol express ly 
disclaimed any intent ion to form a contract or change the "at-
w i l l " s ta tus of employees by the issuance of i t s Handbook. 
Johnson has a l l eged no oral modif icat ions of h i s employment 
terms. Thus, Johnson was an employee at w i l l and affirmation 
of summary judgment in favor of Thiokol i s appropriate on t h i s 
b a s i s a lone. 
11 For example, an a r t i c l e in the Journal of Dispute Resolution 
contains the following paragraph: 
Most handbooks and personnel manuals begin with a br ie f 
introductory statement containing the philosophy of the 
employer and the purpose of the handbook or manual. One 
suggested method for reaffirming the a t - w i l l s tatus of the 
employee and disclaiming any contractual obl igat ions based 
upon the handbook would be to include a paragraph s ta t ing that 
the handbook procedures are: (1) subject to un i la tera l change 
by the employer; (2) not intended to give r i s e to any contract 
with any employee; (3) that such pronouncements are merely 
recommended procedures for use by supervisors; and (4) a l l 
employees are considered to be terminable at the w i l l of the 
employer. This paragraph could be inserted at the end of the 
introductory philosophical statement. 
Davis, Ozier, Quinn, & Williams, "Prevention and Defense of Wrongful 
Discharge Suits in the Corporate Sector," 2 Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 245, 277 (1987). 
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III. THIOKOL FOLLOWED THE GUIDELINES SPECIFIED IN ITS 
HANDBOOK. 
Even if Thiokol were contractually obligated to 
follow the procedures contained in its Handbook, it did so. 
The Handbook specifically identifies two categories of conduct 
warranting disciplinary action: 
Category 1 — Infractions that may result in an 
Employee discussion or Notice of Caution. 
Termination or suspension can occur under 
Category 1, if the severity of the violation 
warrants such action. 
Category 2 — Infractions that will result in a 
Notice of Caution and could result in 
disciplinary suspension or termination. 
R. 100 (emphasis added)• 
Johnson alleges that the Handbook creates a 
"progressive discipline program." See Johnson's Motion to 
File an Amended Complaint, p. 2, 1 6. As is obvious from the 
Handbook itself, this is not the case. See R. 100. The 
Handbook clearly states that violation of any of the listed 
rules may result in immediate termination. Even if Thiokol 
had created a progressive discipline system, however, 
dismissal would have been appropriate since Johnson had 
received a previous Notice of Caution for the same offense of 
Careless or Inefficient Performance of Duty. R. 112. 
Johnson was dismissed for violating the first rule of 
conduct, specifically: "Careless or Inefficient Performance 
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of Duty."12 Johnson admits he was discharged by Morton 
Thiokol for the fol lowing conduct: 
1. Johnson was s p e c i f i c a l l y assigned as an 
inspector of the leak check t e s t on the 
redesigned O-ring system. R. 20. 
2. The inspect ion c r i t e r i a required that 
Johnson "personally witness" the se t -up 
procedure and then ver i fy compliance. 
R. 22. 
3. Johnson v e r i f i e d that he had personal ly 
witnessed the procedure when, in f a c t , he 
had not. R. 22. 
4. During the set -up two high pressure 
nitrogen gas hoses had not been connected 
properly. R. 23. 
5. When the t e s t was run the next day 
overpressurizat ion of the O-ring occurred 
causing property damage and a 20-day delay 
in t e s t f i r i n g . R. 22-23. 
Johnson was aware that h i s v e r i f i c a t i o n s i g n i f i e d he had 
personal ly witnessed the t e s t set -up when he t ru ly had not. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Johnson has never contested the fac t that t h i s 
conduct was an in frac t ion of the r u l e s . He has s p e c i f i c a l l y 
admitted that "dic ipl inary [ s i c ] act ion needed to be taken 
concerning myself," and that a " l e t t e r of caution and days off 
should have been considered and i s sued ." Exhibit E to 
Johnson's Af f idav i t . 
12 Careless or Ineff ic ient Performance of Duty may be e i ther a Category 1 or 
a Category 2 infract ion. R. 101. Johnson's termination notice did not 
specify which category th is par t icu lar incident was placed in, but the 
d i s t inc t ion is i r re levant to the resolution of th i s case since immediate 
termination i s an appropriate discipl inary measure for both categories 
of infract ions. 
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Thus, Johnson has acknowledged he committed the 
indicated offense and acknowledged the appropriateness of 
discipline for it. He attempts to create a dispute precluding 
summary judgment by arguing in various ways that Thiokol 
forced him to violate the rules. As previously noted, none of 
the facts Johnson claims are in dispute are relevant to the 
resolution of the question of whether termination was proper. 
The language of the Handbook is clear and unambiguous in 
specifying immediate termination as an appropriate response to 
"Careless or Inefficient Performance of Duty." Johnson's 
argument that he should have been given a different punishment 
cannot be supported by the language of the Handbook. The 
interpretation of an unambiguous contract "is a question of 
law to be decided by the judge." Morris, 658 P.2d at 1201. 
Hence this court can determine, as a matter of law, that 
Johnson's conduct — which is not in dispute — constituted 
grounds for dismissal since this disciplinary action was 
plainly allowed by the Handbook. 
The disciplinary action expressly permitted by the 
Handbook in response to this infraction included termination 
without prior disciplinary action. Therefore, even if this 
court determines that the Handbook created an employment 
contract, affirmance of summary judgment is appropriate 
-21-
because the Handbook specifically permitted termination under 
these circumstances.13 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law Johnson was an at-will employee of 
Thiokol. The Handbook expressly disavowed any intention to 
13 Johnson has cited a decision of an administrative law judge regarding an 
award of unemployment benefits for the proposition that he was not 
discharged for cause within the meaning of Utah's Employment Security 
Act. Brief of Appellant, p. 14. However, Utah law clearly provides 
that: 
(2) Any findings of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or 
final order made by an unemployment insurance hearing officer, 
appeal referee, or any person with the authority to make 
findings of fact or law in any action or proceeding before the 
unemployment insurance appeals tribunal, is not conclusive or 
binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding, 
. . ., regardless of whether the prior action was between the 
same or related parties or involved the same facts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-10(f)(2) (1989 Supp.). Thus, the ALJ's decision 
has no evidentiary value in this case. 
There are significant policy reasons why the legislature 
established that A U rulings in unemployment benefits cases cannot be 
used to establish facts in subsequent proceedings. First, the standards 
for unemployment liability and for wrongful discharge liability are 
significantly different. An "employee's conduct may be sufficient for 
discharge, but is not necessarily sufficient for a disqualification from 
[unemployment] benefits." Logan Regional HOSD. V. Bd. of Review of the 
Indus. Comm. of the State of Utah. 723 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986). 
Second, serious public policy considerations support the statute. 
Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison. 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The 
unemployment compensation hearing is an informal proceeding designed to 
address a narrow issue of law and provide a limited remedy. Id. at 
1164-1165. Because the amount in controversy is relatively small, the 
employer does not have the incentive to aggressively contest the 
discharged employee's claim. If collateral estoppel were applicable, 
"the employer would have a strong incentive to use its superior 
resources consistently to oppose a discharged employee's claim for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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create a contract. Further, even if the Handbook were 
contractually binding, Johnson's discharge was in compliance 
with its requirements. Therefore summary judgment for Thiokol 
was appropriate and should be affirmed. 
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mar^Ann€fA2. Wood 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
WWWP:AS7 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
unemployment benefits." Id. at 1165. This would lead to lengthy and 
complicated unemployment proceedings frustrating judicial economy, 
delaying payments to the unemployed, and converting administrative 
hearings into forums for unlawful discharge claims. 
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